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Abstract 
In the post-industrial world, data science and analytics have gained paramount importance            
regarding digital data privacy. Improper methods of establishing privacy for accessible datasets can             
compromise large amounts of user data even if the adversary has a small amount of preliminary                
knowledge of a user. Many researchers have been developing high-level privacy-preserving           
mechanisms that also retain the statistical integrity of the data to apply to machine learning. Recent                
developments of differential privacy, such as those in [14], [16], [20], [30], [34], and [4], drastically                
decrease the probability that an adversary can distinguish the elements in a data set and thus                
extract user information. In this paper, we develop three privacy-preserving mechanisms with the             
discrete M-band wavelet transform that embed noise into data. The first two methods (​LS and ​LS​+​)                
add noise through a “Laplace-Sigmoid” distribution that multiplies Laplace-distributed values with           
the sigmoid function, and the third method utilizes pseudo-quantum steganography to embed noise             
into the data. We then show that our mechanisms successfully retain both differential privacy and               
learnability through statistical analysis in various machine learning environments. 
 
Key Words: Differential Privacy, Discrete M-band Wavelet Transform, Laplace-Sigmoid Distribution,          
Pseudo-Quantum Steganography, Statistical Analysis, Machine Learning Environments 
 
Highlights 
In this paper, we create three different input perturbation stochastic mechanisms that add or              
embed noise to sensitive datasets. Our mechanisms improve upon traditional noise addition            
methods, such as the Laplace mechanism and exponential mechanism mentioned in [14], by using              
the discrete M-band wavelet transform (DMWT) to convert the dataset into a wavelet domain              
before adding noise. For the first two mechanisms, we combine the Laplace distribution and the               
sigmoid function to create a complex stochastic function, and we optimize the mechanisms based              
on the size of the dataset. In the third mechanism, we propose the use of pseudo-quantum                
steganography to embed noise into a dataset. Due to the nature of the pseudo-quantum signal, the                
noisy dataset has an extremely low probability of being correctly denoised by an adversary. While               
our proposed mechanisms preserve ε-differential privacy, they also maintain the statistical           
integrity of the datasets. Using five different supervised machine learning environments—logistic           
regression, support vector machine, support vector regression, classical artificial neural networks,           
and deep learning—the mechanisms achieve high accuracies in binary classification across multiple            
datasets. Moreover, our (pseudo-) quantum mechanism is one of the first to use higher              
computational power to add noise to private data. As data privacy becomes an extremely important               
issue in our world, and as quantum computing emerges as a major field, our research can link the                  
two branches and shine a light on what data privacy could potentially look like in the future.  
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 1   Introduction 
More in today’s world than ever, there is extreme tension between the mass collection of people’s                
data by corporations and the people’s rights to privacy for their personal data. Especially on social                
media, user data are constantly collected, and a single mishandling of the data pool can lead to the                  
jeopardization of millions of people’s data. Recent examples are the Facebook $5 billion FTC fine               
[17] and the Equifax data breach settlement [15]. 
There is an important tradeoff between data privacy and statistical analysis. Companies and             
their research units often rely on user-submitted data for making their products better suited for               
the market. Users not only wish to preserve anonymity when submitting data but also to be                
reassured that their individual data cannot be easily identified from a data pool. 
If a person has submitted sensitive information in a study whose data has been leaked, an                
adversary with prior knowledge of the person can use the data to learn something new about the                 
person, and the person’s privacy is effectively compromised. For example, a smoker who             
participates in a survey that requires her to state whether she smokes or not can be harmed if the                   
data is not private. If the study concludes that smoking leads to higher rates of cancer, her                 
insurance rates may be raised if the insurance company finds out she is a smoker from the survey                  
data. 
Unfortunately, anonymizing a dataset is not enough to guarantee that someone’s           
information is safely hidden from adversaries. One famous example of a so-called “re-identification             
attack” is the discovery of Massachusetts governor William Held’s medical records in 1997 by a               
correlation between multiple released datasets [36]: the health database and voter registry. If even              
anonymization does not protect an individual in a dataset, then what method does? 
 
1.1   Prior Works 
Differential privacy is a term coined by Dwork ​et al​. in [3], and further explained in [12], which sets                   
a privacy budget that quantifies data loss for a mechanism during data release. Over the last decade                 
and a half, researchers have been developing different mechanisms that achieve differential privacy             
by minimizing the effect of each individual in the dataset. They do this by adding randomly                
distributed noise to the dataset or a query that slightly obscures the results, enough to ensure                
privacy but not too much to significantly alter the statistical outcomes. 
There are three main ways to add noise to ensure differential privacy, which are input               
perturbation, which is adding noise to the dataset before a query; objective perturbation, which is               
adding noise to the objective function in the machine learning model; and output perturbation,              
which is adding noise to the results after the machine learning model is used. 
One well-known differentially private mechanism is the Laplace mechanism [3], which adds            
Laplace noise with a continuous distribution to a statistical query (output perturbation). However,             
although it preserves differential privacy, the Laplace mechanism requires the addition of a large              
amount of noise to both small and large datasets, which hinders the statistical use of the noisy data                  
[33]. Additionally, [33] shows that not adding enough Laplace noise can make the dataset              
unprotected from a tracker attack. 
Another basic mechanism is the exponential mechanism [30], which provides a utilitarian            
insight into differential privacy by utilizing a quality function to improve upon the usefulness of the                
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 Laplace mechanism. The exponential mechanism is also able to apply to non-numeric queries.             
However, [7] shows that the noise added through the exponential mechanism is asymptotically             
non-negligible. 
Similar to the exponential mechanism, posterior sampling [11] provides a Bayesian           
approach to differential privacy, and it uses problem-dependent distributions. 
Other mechanisms stated in [38], [23], [19], [9], [39], and [6] use composition theorems and               
the post-processing invariance property stated in [13] to derive mechanisms based on the basic              
Laplace and exponential mechanisms. Some mechanisms also use alternative definitions of privacy            
that may relax or tighten its stipulations, such as in [32]. 
 
1.2   New Ideas 
In this research, we use input perturbation to add noise to the dataset directly. We propose three                 
newly derived mechanisms that preserve differential privacy—the first two use a doubly stochastic             
process that adds Laplace-Sigmoid distributed noise to data, and the third uses pseudo-quantum             
signals to embed the noise into the data. For all three of our mechanisms, we use discrete 3-band                  
wavelets to transform the data set into the wavelet domain before embedding noise, making the               
processes impossible to completely reverse without access to the randomized noise. 
When first reading our work, one may ask, “What are the benefits of using the discrete                
M-band wavelet transform?” For one, adding noise to only the approximation part of the              
transformed matrix, in the case of the first Laplace-Sigmoid mechanism (​LS​), allows the resulting              
matrix to retain its detailed parts, which are essential for statistical analysis. As a result, we have a                  
transformed matrix that is differentially private yet preserves statistical integrity. Moreover,           
wavelets effectively scale non-stationary data, which has changing variance and a short-term mean.             
But, why specifically the M-Band wavelet transform? 
Xiao ​et al. in [4] introduces a method of preserving -differential privacy via ​Privelet and          ε      
Privelet​+​, which transform the original dataset via the Haar Wavelet Transform (HWT) and add              
Laplace noise based on calculated weights. ​Privelet performs well with range-count queries, which             
solves the inability to produce meaningful results from large aggregate queries using Dwork ​et al.​’s               
mechanism. 
However, Privelet’s use of the Haar wavelet, the simplest wavelet, can result in easier              
de-noising of the data by an adversary. Additionally, the Haar wavelet’s design is static, unlike               
M-band wavelets. Most M-band wavelets with ​M > 2 have real values and finite support and are                 
orthogonal, which is a property that is hard to obtain with simpler types of wavelets. M-Band                
wavelets are also smoother and perform well with image analysis. 
Using the discrete M-band wavelet transform, we create two mechanisms that use a             
combination of Laplace noise and the sigmoid function, and one mechanism that utilizes             
pseudo-quantum signals to input noise into data (pseudo-quantum steganography). 
For the first two mechanisms, the combination of the Laplace distribution and the sigmoid              
function allows the added noise to be dependent on the dataset, not just a single distribution,                
similar to the Report Noisy Max mechanism in [20]. The addition of the sigmoid function also adds                 
another degree of randomization that does not add to the privacy budget, since the function is                
bounded. 
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 For the third mechanism, we propose a new method of treating the noise as a watermark, or                 
secret information, to the data instead of a simple additive distribution. Steganography is the              
technique of masking information behind seemingly innocent text or images. Following principles            
of steganography, we develop a mechanism that transforms data into pseudo-quantum signals,            
which are highly difficult to detect by adversaries, such as in [26]. Although we do not have access                  
to true quantum computers, we are able to use pseudo-quantum methods that mimic qubits. As a                
result, the mechanism is able to encrypt the noise into an indistinguishable signal, then embed the                
signal in the discrete wavelet domain. Because the mechanism includes stochastic elements and             
does not store any values, the key to decrypt the noise is impossible to be retrieved from an                  
adversary. 
One such paper that uses a similar model, especially with the use of quantum computing, is                
[34]. However, [34] only adds Laplace noise to queries, which has the same disadvantages as the                
Laplace mechanism proposed in [3]: the noise is too large in magnitude for small datasets. The                
magnitude of the noise in our pseudo-quantum mechanism is able to be controlled by a noise                
embedding factor. In our tests, we also compare the accuracy of Convolutional Neural Networks              
with the MNIST image dataset after our pseudo-quantum mechanism with the results from Abadi ​et.               
al.​’s differentially private SGD algorithm in [5]. 
 
2   Background 
2.1   Discrete M-band Wavelet Transform (DMWT) 
In numerical and function analysis, wavelet transforms decompose an input signal into different             
frequency levels. The wavelets are discretely sampled and capture both frequency and location             
information. 
Discrete M-band wavelet transforms (DMWT) use M filter banks, where M ≥ 2, to break a                
K-dimensional signal into M frequency levels. In our paper, we use a slightly modified version of                
DMWT, choosing to use the signal in multiple column vectors after it is transformed once. In other                 
words, we use the product ​WX​, where ​W is the M-band wavelet transform matrix and ​X is the input                   
dataset. The resulting frequency levels include the low-pass approximation (scaling) matrix and            
M - 1 high-pass detail matrices. 
One application of wavelets is in Multiresolution Analysis, shown in [28]. The low-pass filter              
bank forms linearly independent vectors that span the approximation spaces , while the          V i    
high-pass filter banks form the detail spaces . As transformation continues, the approximation       W i       
spaces are decomposed as the direct sum of higher-level approximation and detail subspaces:             
.V i = V i + 1 ⊕W i + 1  
For instance, the Daubechies 4 wavelet approximation space can be decomposed as ℝ​16            
. When ​i = 3, the subspaces have dimension 2; when ​i = 2, the subspace= V 0 = V 2 ⊕W 1 ⊕W 2 ⊕W 3                 
has dimension 4; and when ​i = 1, the subspace has dimension 8. In the case a 3-band wavelet                   
transform, and the space can be decomposed as ℝ​9 ⊕ ,V i = V i + 1 ⊕W i + 1,1 W i + 1,2         
.V=  0 = V 2 ⊕W 2,1 ⊕W 2,2 ⊕W 1,1 ⊕W 1,2  
Each M-band orthonormal wavelet has M filter banks. Let an M-band wavelet have filter              
banks α​(1)​, β​(1)​, … , β​(M-1)​. Then the filter banks have the properties for ​m​ = 1, … , ​M​ - 1: 
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where ​N is the length of each filter bank. Additionally, if the M-band wavelet is also k-regular, it has                   
a fourth property: 
 
 
 
for ​j​ = 0, … , ​K​ - 1. 
For all three of our mechanisms, we use a 2-regular 3-band (k = 2, M = 3) orthonormal                  
wavelet transform to break down our input data into the frequency levels. We obtain the 3-band                
filter banks from [24]. 
 
α β​(1) β​(2) 
α​1​ = 0.33838609728386 = -0.11737701613483β1
(1)  = 0.40363686892892β1
(2)  
α​2​ = 0.53083618701374 = 0.54433105395181β2
(1)  = -0.62853936105471β2
(2)  
α​3​ = 0.72328627674361 = -0.01870574735313β3
(1)  = 0.46060475252131β3
(2)  
α​4​ = 0.23896417190576 = -0.69911956479289β4
(1)  = -0.40363686892892β4
(2)  
α​5​ = 0.04651408217589 = -0.13608276348796β5
(1)  = -0.07856742013185β5
(2)  
α​6​ = -0.14593600755399 = 0.42695403781698β6
(1)  = 0.24650202866523β6
(2)  
Table 2.1: Filter banks for our paper 
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Figure 2.1: Example of a 2-regular 3-band 27 x 27 wavelet transform matrix 
 
2.2   Quantum Computing and Pseudo-Quantum Signals 
Normal computers store information in classical bits, which exist in one of two states: 0 or 1. In                  
contrast, quantum computers use quantum bits, or qubits, which can be in any linear combinations               
of and​ as states. Qubit states can be expressed as0⟩ [0, ]  | =  1 T 1⟩ [1, ]  | =  0 T  
 
 
 
where ​a and ​b are complex numbers and . Qubits also represent points on a 3-D unit        a| b| | 2 + | 2 = 1          
sphere. As there are infinite points on a unit sphere, there are infinite states for a qubit. 
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   Figure 2.2: The qubit 
 
Another way to write the state of the qubit is 
 
   
 
where  and  are real numbers.θ φ  
As shown in [26], signal ​S = ​[​s​1 s​2 ... s​N​]​
T can be transformed into a pseudo-quantum signal                   
with a transformation ​F​, where ​F is called a pseudo quantum signal converter. Let ​F be a linear                  
transformation where 
 
 
 
 
 
Then, ​F transforms signal ​S into the interval with for ​i = ​1, 2, . . . , ​N​. (In        , ][ 6
mπ
3
nπ   (s )θi = F i             
our paper, we use the case where ​m = 1 and ​n = 1.) The transformed signal values are changed into                     
angles , and  can be used to redefine a pseudo qubit asθi θi  
 
 
 
In the case of a pseudo qubit,φ = 0 and the signal can take on values from a circle instead of                      
the sphere shown in Figure 2.2. ​The transformation result, while not a real quantum signal, is a                 
pseudo-quantum angle that can be computed by classical computers. Thus, pseudo-quantum signals            
are important for situations when only classical computers can be used to simulate quantum              
signals. In this research, we propose a new privacy-preserving pseudo-quantum steganography           
mechanism. 
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 3   Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms 
3.1   ε-differential privacy 
In 2006, Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith’s article [3] introduced the concept ofε-differential              
privacy, a mathematical definition for the privacy loss associated with any data release drawn from               
a statistical database. 
 
Definition 1 ​Let D and D’ be neighboring datasets, i.e. that they differ in only one element. A                  
randomized mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy if, for any outputs t,ε  
 
 
 
For small values of , expε ε) .( ≈ ε + 1  
-differential privacy guarantees that there is low probability for an adversary to discoverε              
new information about a unique individual in the dataset, despite having known prior outside              
knowledge. This fact means the dataset is robust to post-processing. In other words, the adversary               
is no more likely to pick the true values than if they were to guess randomly. 
 
A privacy-preserving mechanism also ensures that the inclusion or removal of one data             
sample will not alter the overall data set significantly. Individuals who are reluctant to submit data                
in fear that an adversary will identify their information will be assured that their participation has a                 
marginal effect on the output. It is guaranteed that an -differentially private result would not be          ε       
significantly affected regardless of any one individual’s truthful participation. However, in order for             
the overall data to be useful for statistical analysis, needs to be scaled accordingly, i.e. each        ε         
individual data sample needs to have a non-zero impact. 
 
Definition 2 ​Let f : ​ℝ​k​, and let D and D’ be neighboring datasets. The sensitivity S(f) of f is     Dn →                 
defined to be 
 
 
 
where is the ​l​1​ norm.·|| ||1  
 
For randomized mechanisms ​A​, the sensitivity is at most 1, since the neighboring datasets              
differ in at most 1 element. Dwork ​et al. showed in [8] that for any function in a query               f (x)  x = Σi i     
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 where is a random variable from the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale /(x) ,q = f + Y   Y             1
, this mechanism is -differentially private. However, Dwork ​et al.​’s output perturbation Laplaceε     ε          
mechanism adds too much noise to even small datasets. 
 
3.2   LS Mechanism 
3.2.1   Steps to Embed LS Noise 
Step 1: Discrete M-band Wavelet Transform 
Perform the discrete M-band wavelet transform on ​D to obtain the respective approximation and              
detail parts of the signal. Although the approximation and detail parts are actually composed of               
individual column vectors representing each sample, we combine the vectors into the            
corresponding approximation matrix ​A​ and detail matrices ​ for d i
(1) , .., .i = 1 . k  
 
 
 
where ​k​ = ​M​ - 1. In the case of 3-Band wavelets, ​k​ = 2. 
 
Step 2: Data-Sensitive Bound Creation 
Define µ to be the maximum value of all elements in ​A​, and 𝑣 to be the minimum value of all                     
elements in ​A​. Let ​γ be the data-sensitive bound parameter. Then, define a new matrix ​A​* by                 
transforming each element of ​A to a value bound in the interval [-𝛾, 𝛾] through a linear function                  .g  
Hence, ​A​* has the property of being sensitive to the values of the original dataset ​D​, and the noise                   
added later is, therefore, fitting for ​D​. For 𝛾 > 0, we create ​A​* by the following procedure: 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: Laplace-Sigmoid Distribution 
Definition 3​   ​A variable from the Laplace-Sigmoid distribution is defined to be(y) N ij  
 
 
 
where X ~ Lap /  for some  and  is the sigmoid function.0, 1(  )ε′ ,ε′ > 0 (y)S = 11 + e −y  
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 Like ​X​, the noise ​N​ has mean 0. 
We can create a final noise matrix by using the Laplace-Sigmoid distribution with       (A )N *        
. This hybrid noise-generating mechanism uses the shrunken data values obtained in/(1 )ε′ = ε + e−γ             
Step 2 and the values from the Laplace-Sigmoid distribution. We can achieve a roughly equal               
distribution of positive and negative noise values, as the mean of ​N is 0. The new noise matrix ​N is                    
sensitive to the values of the original dataset. 
 
Step 4: Insert New Approximation Matrix 
We construct a new approximation matrix and insert it back into the wavelet      (A )A
︿
= A + N *         
transformed data. Because the wavelet matrix ​W is orthogonal, it is easy to transform the               
transformed data back to its original domain since . We obtain the “noisy” dataset.W T = W −1  
 
 
 
is now differentially private (we prove it below with Theorem 1) yet it can still be used D
︿
                 
with relatively little error in machine learning environments. Experiments in various machine            
learning environments are covered in Section 4. Note also that because we use binary classification               
in several machine learning environments, we must have discrete values for the last column              
(labels) in the transformed data. If the label then we set and if then we set        .5,yi ≥ 0     ,yi = 1    .5,yi < 0     
 The following Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 prove that ​LS​ is -differentially private..yi = 0 ε  
 
Lemma 1 ​Let and where Lap / . Let be a randomized   (D)f = D  (D) (D) ,F = f + Y   Y ~  0, 1(  )ε   (X)A     
mechanism. Then,  satisfies -differential privacy.(F (D))A ε  
 
Proof:  
Dwork ​et al.​ prove in [3] that for any randomized function  such that  whereF (D) (D) ,F = f + Y  
 Lap / ,  is -differentially private.Y ~ 0, S(F )(  )ε (D)F ε   
 
For emphasis, we restate their proof here. 
Let a randomized mechanism ​F : ​D​n → ​ℝ​k and an arbitrary point ​t∈ℝ​k​. Then, we can take the ratio                      
of the probability density functions of the Laplace noise added to neighboring datasets ​D​ and ​D​’: 
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Thus, by the rules of composability stated in [14],  satisfies -differential privacy. ∎(F (D))A ε  
 
Theorem 1 ​Let be the LS mechanism with original dataset D and Laplace noise Lap   S(D)L             Y ~  
/ , ​let W be the M-band wavelet transform matrix, and let γ be the data-sensitive bound0, 1(  )ε′                 
parameter. Then,  preserves -differential privacy, where S(D)L ε   / (1 ).ε′ = ε + e−γ  
 
Proof: 
We can write the ​LS​ mechanism as 
 
 
 
 
 
 Since is an orthonormal M-band wavelet, we see thatW T  
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Thus, multiplying by preserves the norm of ​N​’:W T  
 
 
 
We also know that by the data-sensitive bound creation linear transformation. Then,    − γ ≤ A*ij ≤ γ          
we conclude that 
 
, 
 
Thus, 
 
 
It follows that By Lemma 1, a randomized mechanism   1 )( + e−γ N|| ij
|
| ≤ X
|
| ij
|
| .       A(F (D)) (D) , = f + Y  
where Lap / satisfies -differential privacy. Therefore, since is Y ~  0, 1(  )ε′  ε ′      (1 ) ε ,ε =  + e−γ ′  S(D)L   
-differentially private. ∎ε  
 
3.2.2   De-Noising the LS Dataset 
As our mechanism is a function, one should expect that an original dataset would be obtainable by                 
simply applying the inverse transformation on the noisy dataset, which we call :D
︿
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 However, since the noise matrix is randomized based on a Laplace-Sigmoid distribution, it is              
impossible to regain the exact original data without having access to ​N​, which is not stored in the                  
first place. Nevertheless, it is possible to regain an approximation of the original dataset, though not                
very accurate, by having stored the logical values of Laplace-distributed ​X from the mechanism. In               
order words, we can define matrix the same size as the noise matrix that stores 1 if the noise in that                     
position is positive and -1 if the noise in that position is negative. We call this logical matrix                  
trace(​X​). An adversary should not have direct access to trace(​X​), but instead can create a matrix of                 
random logical values of the same size. 
We can construct an approximation of the noise matrix by multiplying trace(​X​) by a factor,               
then use it in the inverse transformation function to obtain ​D​. However, the factor does not directly                 
correspond to ​X​, as the random noise used to transform the data is not accessible. So, one way to                   
approach de-noising is to test a new factor ​r that brings us close to the true values of the noise in                     
the original mechanism: 
 
 
 
How close of an estimate to the original dataset we can obtain is dependent on the values of                  
𝛾 and ε, though the former does not affect the noise as much as the latter. Of course, an adversary                    
would not know both of the values used in the mechanism. 
To test this de-noising method, we use the IPUMS​2 Dataset mentioned in Section 4.1. To               
justify our point that obtaining the original dataset is nearly impossible without knowing the              
mechanism’s variables, we take the average of the absolute difference between the original dataset              
and the dataset obtained by varying ​r​. We do this for values of ​r ranging from -1 to 1 with an                     
increment of 0.1, then we take the minimum of the trials. Finally, we do the entire process for 100                   
trials, corresponding to the value of ε. We keep 𝛾 = 1 constant. Let ​H = the average minimum                   
absolute difference between the original ​D​ and the de-noised ​D​. 
 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
H 0.4208 0.2121 0.1044 0.0522 0.0262 
 
As is shown, ​H approximately directly varies with / i.e. ​H∝ / Therefore, unless the        1 ,ε     1 .ε     
value of ε is large and trace(​X​) is somehow released to the public, an adversary would not be able                   
to retrieve a close form of the original dataset by using a de-noising method. 
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 3.3   The LS+ Mechanism 
3.3.1   Versus the LS Mechanism 
At times, it is not adequate to apply the ​LS ​mechanism on an entire dataset. One such case is if the                     
dataset is too large, then the wavelet matrix may take too long to generate. We encounter this                 
problem by generating wavelets of dimension 3​10 and upwards, as our computers do not have               
sufficient memory. 
The second such case is if the individual wants to disperse the approximation and detail               
portions of individual blocks in the database rather than add noise to only one of the whole                 
dataset’s approximation or details. 
Another case in which the ​LS​+ mechanism is the better option is when the number of rows                 
of the dataset is not numerically close to the wavelet’s size. Additionally, using the ​LS​+ mechanism                
allows new entries to be incorporated quicker without having to wait for large amounts of samples.                
On top of making the dataset dynamic to new samples, the ​LS​+ mechanism allows for the potential                 
of parallel computing to reduce computational time and complexity. 
 
3.3.2   Steps to Embed LS+ Noise 
To utilize the ​LS​+ mechanism with 3-band wavelets, as in this paper, the dataset’s number of rows                 
must be divisible by the size of the wavelet matrix. We apply the Laplace-Sigmoid distributed noise                
and add it to the full matrix. 
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We can write the mechanism as a function , where and        (D) NF = D + W n
T   W n =   
. [N  N  ... N ]N =  1 2 n
T  
The ​LS​+ mechanism can be proved to be differentially private by Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.                
It is mathematically similar to the ​LS ​mechanism, but it is a more complete method of adding noise.                  
Thus, we can use this mechanism for bigger datasets. 
Similar to the ​LS ​mechanism, the transformed dataset ensures that the ε-differentially        D
︿
     
private dataset cannot be reversed without much deviation from the original dataset, even with              
access to the signs of the noise, trace(​X​). 
 
Corollary 1 ​Let n be the number of blocks in dataset D. Then, if each block in the dataset D​N resulting                     
from the LS+ mechanism is ε-differentially private, then F(D) is ε-differentially private. 
 
Proof: 
We can apply Theorem 1 to each block of the ​LS​+ dataset. Let ​W be the wavelet corresponding to                   
each block and letting ​N’ be the noise matrix , we again see that         N  0 ... 0][ 1
T      
For each block, the LS noise added is less than ​X​. So, each block is|W N || |N || |N || |X ||.| n
T ′ = | ′ = | 1 < |                
ε-differentially private. 
 
By the Parallel Composition theory in [29], a composition mechanism that involves disjoint subsets              
of the dataset in each mechanism does not add up in privacy loss for each mechanism; instead, the                  
dataset after the composition mechanism has the maximum ε value of the submechanisms. Since              
LS​+ is a composition mechanism whose submechanisms only involve disjoint subsets by            
partitioning the dataset in blocks, and each block is ε-differentially private, the overall F(D) is               
ε-differentially private. ∎ 
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 3.4   The Pseudo-Quantum Mechanism 
3.4.1   Quantum Steganography 
When using a quantum computer, one can generate a true random qubit that satisfiesSij  
 
 
 
to be used in the quantum embedding of the noise into the approximation coefficients. So, each                
index can be embedded with qubits instead of a pseudo-quantum simulation: 
 
 
 
However, if one does not have access to a quantum computer, the following             
pseudo-quantum algorithm must be used. 
 
3.4.2   Steps to Embed Pseudo-Quantum Noise 
Step 1: Discrete M-band Wavelet Transform 
We perform DMWT on the dataset ​D of size ​m x ​n with wavelet matrix ​W​. Instead of keeping the                    
approximation part of the dataset in the wavelet domain as a matrix, we split it up into column                  
vectors representing each sample. This mechanism shows the case of a discrete 3-band wavelet              
transform, which we use in our experiments. 
 
 
 
Step 2: Transform Approximation Coefficients into Angles 
In order to embed the noise into the approximation signal, we must transform the approximation               
coefficients into pseudo-quantum signals, or angles. 
 
  
 
  
 
This procedure ensures that the new approximation coefficients  are bounded in .θ ij , ][ 6
π
3
π  
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 Step 3: Generate Laplace Noise and Transform into Pseudo-Quantum Signals 
To make our mechanism stochastic, we randomly generate Laplace-distributed noise with mean 0             
and scale /2 .ε  
 
 
 
Then, we transform ​X​ into the same angle bounds as the approximation coefficients. The noise 
matrix is created to be the same size as the combined approximation matrix, whose number of 
columns is just ​n​. To be added, it must be transformed into pseudo-quantum signals :xij  
 
  
 
 
 
Step 4: Pseudo-Quantum Embedding 
We embed the Laplace noise into the transformed approximation coefficients by mimicking a             
quantum computer’s random generation. Using a classical computer, we randomly generate values 
 
 
 
and use the values to embed the noise into a new matrix  such thatθE   
 
 
 
where 𝛿 is the embedding intensity andη is the embedding bias, 0 ≤η ≤ 1. We use 𝛿 = 0.1 andη =                         
0 in our trials. 
 
Step 5: Inverse Transformation 
In order to obtain the new approximation matrix ​A​* with the embedded noise, we do the inverse                 
transformation of the linear transformation before: 
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 Step 6: Inverse DMWT 
Finally, we perform the inverse wavelet transform after inserting the new approximation matrix ​A​*. 
 
 
 
Because the dataset is binary, we must have two outputs: 0 and 1. Like in the ​LS and ​LS​+                   
mechanisms, if the label  then  and if  then yi ≥ .5,− 0 ,yi = 1 yi < .5,− 0 .yi = 0  
 
Lemma 2 ​Let ~ Lap ​and let be the angle in corresponding to Then, the   X ij   0, )( σ    xij     , ][ 6
π
3
π    .X ij   
resulting probability density function of any signal z embedded with through pseudo-quantum          x    
steganography is equal to 
 
 
where δ is the embedding intensity. 
 
Proof: 
Let be the resulting signal of ​z embedded with We can write the steganography the same way θij
E         x.         
as in Step 4 of the pseudo-quantum mechanism. 
 
Then, the probability density function  of  ​δ​cos  can be written as(y)f x )( ij  
 
 
 
where ​y​ Hence, the probability density function  of cos​-1 δ​cos  is given by, ].∈ [ 2
1
2
√3 (z)p1 ( x ))( ij  
 
 
 
where ​z​ , ].∈ [ 6
π
3
π  
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 Similarly, assuming sin​-1 > 0, the probability density function of ​δ​sin  isy (y)g x )( ij  
 
 
 
where ​y​ and the probability density function  of sin​-1 δ​sin  is, ],∈ [ 2
1
2
√3 (z)p2 ( x ))( ij  
 
 
 
where ​z Since ​z > 0, ​z = |​z​|. Thus, taking the weighted sum of and the  , ]. ∈ [ 6
π
3
π              (z)p1   (z),p2  
probability distribution function  of  can be written as(z)h θij
E  
 
∎ 
 
Theorem 2​   ​The pseudo-quantum mechanism with ~ Lap /  is ε-differentially private.X ij 0,( 2 )ε  
 
Proof: 
The pseudo-quantum mechanism can be written as a function ​f​ of ​D​: 
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 where ​A is the original approximation matrix and ​A​* is the approximation matrix with embedded               
noise. Using Lemma 2, we can obtain the probability density function of . Then, we see that for            θij
E       
neighboring datasets ​D​ and ​D​’ and for a query ​q​, 
 
 
 
Therefore, by Definition 1, the pseudo-quantum mechanism is ε-differentially private. ∎ 
 
Remark 1 ​The embedding intensity ​𝛿 in the pseudo-quantum mechanism has the least upper bound               
.2√3 − 1   
 
Proof: 
We know that 
 
 
 
for wavelet approximation pseudo-quantum signals and Laplace noise pseudo-quantum signals     θ ij       
Since the maximum value of both the cosine and sine functions in the interval is. xij               , ][ 6
π
3
π   /2,√3  
and since the maximum value of both the inverse cosine and inverse sine functions is 1, we see that 
 
 
 
Therefore, the least upper bound of 𝛿 is  This is also shown in [26]. ∎.155.2√3 − 1 < 0  
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 3.4.3   De-Noising the Pseudo-Quantum Dataset 
Data encrypted with noise from quantum steganography is impossible to de-noise completely. The             
noise simply cannot be retrieved without knowing the original dataset, the embedding intensity 𝛿,              
and the embedding bias η. 
The only way to extract the noise embedded in the data as pseudo-quantum signals is to       x           
use the following formula: 
 
 
 
However, extracting the noise is redundant because the adversary would need to have the              
original approximation coefficients in the first place. Therefore, the transformed dataset is resistant             
to harmful post-processing. 
Moreover, for η = 0, the probability for an adversary to decode the noise added to the                 
approximation coefficients by randomization in is only , where the dataset has size ​m​ ⨉ ​n​.kij 2
−mn/3  
 
4   Machine Learning Environments and Experiment Results 
In our paper, we employ the three mechanisms in five machine learning environments. 
 
4.1   Datasets 
We utilize 2 different datasets in our paper depending on the mechanism and the machine               
learning environment. The first dataset, IPUMS, is obtained from the Integrated Public Use             
Microdata Series (IPUMS) [1] and has 8 predictors and 1 binary results column with 3190032               
instances. The predictors are: number of generations, detailed information for number of            
generations, family size, race, detailed information for race, whether the participant is deaf,             
whether the participant has a cognitive disability, and whether the participant is blind. The binary               
resultant is whether the participant speaks English or not. 
Due to the ​LS​+ mechanism’s ability to add noise with small-sized wavelets, we are able to                
use many samples in the ​LS​+ training and testing sets. We choose to use 90000 samples for training                  
and 30000 samples for testing, and all samples are randomly chosen from the IPUMS Dataset every                
time the mechanism is run. For all ​LS​+ trials, we use blocks of size 9 x 9. 
For the ​LS and pseudo-quantum mechanisms, we use 19683 samples for training and 729              
samples for testing because our computer only has enough memory to generate and store a               
maximum of 3​9 as the length of the 3-band wavelet. The samples for the pseudo-quantum               
mechanism are randomly chosen from the IPUMS dataset. 
The third dataset, MNIST [2], is a public image dataset commonly used in machine learning               
research. We use it to train and test Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). MNIST consists of a                
training set with 60000 images of handwritten digits (0 to 9) and a testing set with 10000 different                  
images of handwritten digits. The sets are pre-randomized. Each image is 28 x 28, but since we                 
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 must add noise to each image, we cut the last column and last row of each image (which are                   
insignificant to classification) in order to use the pseudo-quantum mechanism with 3-band wavelet             
length of 27. 
 
 LS LS​+ Pseudo-Quantum 
Logistic Regression IPUMS​2 IPUMS​1 IPUMS​2 
Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) 
IPUMS​2 IPUMS​1 IPUMS​2 
Support Vector 
Regression (SVR) 
IPUMS​2 IPUMS​1 IPUMS​2 
Classical Artificial 
Neural Network 
IPUMS​2 IPUMS​1 IPUMS​2 
Deep Learning IPUMS​2 IPUMS​1 MNIST 
IPUMS​1​: 90000 samples in training set, 30000 samples in testing set; randomized from 3190032 samples 
IPUMS​2​: 2187 samples in training set, 729 samples in testing set; randomized from 3190032 samples 
MNIST: 60000 samples of 27 x 27 images in training set, 10000 samples of 27 x 27 images in testing set 
 
Note: We train each classifier or network using the noisy training set. Then, we add noise to                 
the testing set predictors and use the classifier or network to predict the testing set responses. To                 
calculate the accuracy, we take the absolute difference between the real responses and the              
responses predicted by the machine learning model, and we find the proportion of correct              
predictions. This process makes up one trial. For all the machine learning environments except              
Deep Learning, we run 1000 trials for eachε = 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, and we take the average accuracy. We                      
only run one trial in Deep Learning for each value of ε for the three mechanisms due to time                   
restraint and computer resources. 
In addition to ε, each mechanism has other variables. For the ​LS and ​LS​+ mechanisms, we                
test each ε value at 𝛾 = 0.5, 1, 2. For the pseudo-quantum mechanism in machine learning                 
environments, we keep 𝛿 = 0.1 and η = 0 constant for all ε values. For Section 4.6 (Differentially                   
Private Imaging), we vary 𝛿. Note that neither 𝛿 nor η affect the privacy of the noisy dataset. 
 
4.2   Logistic Regression 
Data analysis often requires tools and algorithms to predict future cases based on pre-existing              
datasets. Machine learning algorithms, such as logistic regression, take pre-existing datasets           
separated into predictor variables and label variables, analyze the relationship between the two,             
and create models that classify or predict future samples of data [31]. 
We use a logistic regression model as the first machine learning environment to test the ​LS                
mechanism with Database A. Logistic regression uses the logistic curve, which uses the sigmoid              
function. 
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Figure 4.1: Logistic regression model vs. linear regression model 
 
Logistic regression is a classification model represented by ​p​, a function of x that represents               
the probability that the respective label to x is 1. If ​p ≥ 0.5, then the model predicts that the x value                      
corresponds to a label value of 1; conversely, if ​p < 0.5, then the model predicts 0 for the label value.                     
The function ​p​ for a logistic regression model is defined to have the property: 
 
 
 
where is the data vector, β​0 is the bias constant, andβ​1 is the coefficient vector to the predictor x                    
variables. The solution of this equation, , is called the decision boundary and divides the      β0 + β1 · x          
two label classes. If is one dimension, the decision boundary would be a point, and if x is two    x                 
dimensional, it would be a line [8]. 
The equation of a logistic regression model is the sigmoid function of the logit function of ​p​.                 
The logit function is the natural logarithm of the odds of ​p​. 
 
 
 
 
Substituting the logit function of ​p for the equation , we obtain the form of a         β0 + β1 · x        
logistic regression model to be 
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 A logistic regression model uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to solve for the             
parameters β​0 and β​1​. Let be a probability function where the probability of the label variable     p             
is , and the probability of is . With predictor variable and1y =    p      y = 0   1 − p      {x , , .., }X =  1 x2 . xn   
binary label variable , the likelihood function is:y , , .., }Y = { 1 y2 . yn  
 
 
 
Solving for the maximum of the likelihood function requires finding the derivative, but since              
the likelihood function is difficult to differentiate, the log-likelihood function is used instead: 
 
 
 
Simplifying the log-likelihood function gives: 
 
 
 
Define the cost function  as:(β , )J 0 β1  
 
 
 
Then to maximize the log-likelihood function is the same as minimizing the cost function.              
Our aim is to estimate and so that the cost function is minimized. So we first take partial     β0   β1              
derivatives of  with respect to  and  to derive the stochastic gradient descent rule:(β , )J 0 β1 β0 β1j  
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Now, in order to find the weights of the model, we take a step proportional to positive 
direction of the gradient to minimize the cost function. Furthermore, we add coefficients, the 
learning rates  and  to the weight updates.η1 η0  
 
 
 
LS - Logistic Regression 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.99 94.81 94.87 94.88 95.08 97.65 98.68 99.41 99.40 99.96 99.93 99.89 100.0 100.0 99.99 
 
LS+ - Logistic Regression 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.86 94.82 94.90 94.91 95.05 97.82 98.05 99.03 99.40 99.78 99.89 99.90 99.99 99.99 99.99 
 
PQ - Logistic 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.80 94.92 95.12 95.19 95.39 
 
4.3   Support Vector Machine and Regression 
4.3.1   Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
The support vector machine is a machine learning algorithm used for classifying data into binary               
classes. An SVM model takes a training data set consisting of predictors and their            {x , , .., }1 x2 . xn    
respective binary labels where , and constructs a hyperplane that   {y , , .., }1 y2 . yn   0, }y ∈ { 1       
separates the data based on the labels. 
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Figure 4.2: Support vector machine model with binary targets 
 
Labels y are classified from predictors ​x​ and parameters ​w​ and ​b​: 
 
 
 
SVM models achieve high classification accuracy by maximizing the width between the            
margins, or the distance between the hyperplane and the closest vectors on each side (the “support                
vectors”) [18]. With small margins, the hyperplane may overfit the training data on either side and                
make classification errors with actual testing data. For a linear SVM model, the margin width is                
maximized by solving the following primal problem: 
 
 
 
where is the slack variable that gives the model flexibility for some misclassifications while still ξi                
maintaining the largest possible margins. represents the trade-off between misclassification     C       
cases and large margins. The solution to this minimization problem is also a stationary point of                
Lagrange function: 
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 where and are non-zero Lagrange multipliers, as shown in [31]. This Lagrange equation is αi   βi              
solved by maximizing the following dual problem: 
 
 
 
 
Then, we obtain the weight vector :w  
 
 
 
So the classifier can be written as .(x) gn( y x x )f = s ∑
n
i=1
αi i i
T + b  
When a linear hyperplane cannot accurately separate the dataset, the SVM model uses a              
nonlinear function that maps the inputs in a higher dimension and allows the SVM model to  (x)φ                
separate data that are impossible to linearly separate in lower-dimensional spaces [​18​]. Then the              
corresponding kernel function is defined by The margin for an SVM model      (x , ) (x ) (x ).K i xj = φ i · φ j        
using a kernel function is maximized by solving the primal problem in the transformed    (x , )K i xj            
space: 
 
 
 
The margin can also be maximized by the corresponding dual problem in the transformed space: 
 
 
 
 
The weight vector for the kernel function optimization problem then becomes: 
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And the classifier now is given by .(x) sgn( y k(x , ) )f =  ∑
n
i=1
αi i i x + b  
The dual problem in linear SVM and the kernel trick can look complicated, but note that                
most of the  values are equal to 0. For our paper, we use the Gaussian kernel function in the formαi  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Example of data mapped in 3-dimensional space with Gaussian kernel 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Nonlinear support vector machine classification of with the first two predictors D
︿
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 LS - SVM 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.90 94.88 94.90 94.86 94.90 95.06 96.60 97.06 97.22 97.87 97.96 98.03 98.26 98.17 98.29 
 
LS+ - SVM 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.84 94.86 94.86 94.87 94.88 94.87 95.58 96.91 97.43 98.30 98.53 98.64 98.89 98.93 98.95 
 
PQ - SVM 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.81 94.84 94.85 94.93 94.94 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Average percent accuracy of SVM classification where 𝛾 = 1 
 
4.3.2   Support Vector Regression (SVR) 
A support vector model can also be used for regression. Instead of classifying data into binary                
classes in SVM models, support vector regression uses a training set of predictors and             x , , .. , }{ 1 x2 . xn  
their respective label values , ​y∈ℝ, to construct a model that attempts to output label   y , , .. , }{ 1 y2 . yn              
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 values that are within an error bound of ϵ from the actual observed value (not to be confused with                   
the ε parameter from ε-differential privacy). 
 
Figure 4.6: Support vector regression model with real targets 
 
SVR differs from SVM by outputting values that are not limited to binary; instead, they range                
across all real numbers. Therefore, the output ​y​ is defined to be: 
 
 
 
where is the Gaussian kernel function aforementioned in Section 4.3.1. Since it is (x , )K i xj              
impossible for the model to perfectly output points that fall within the ϵ error bound, slack variables                 
are used to allow errors up to the values of and [35]. The optimization problem for the          ξi   ξi*        
margin width for an SVR model, which is extremely similar to the optimization equation for SVM                
due to both using support vector models,  then becomes: 
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 In order to find the optimal ϵ value for the ​LS and ​LS​+ mechanisms, we run 100 trials for                   
each of the ϵ values ranging from 0.000 to 0.500 with increments of 0.001. The accuracies from the                  
100 trials are averaged for each ϵ value. For larger ϵ values, the error bounds at either side of the                    
SVR model are larger and the model predicts with more errors. Therefore, we pick the smallest ϵ                 
value that corresponds with the highest average accuracy across the 100 trials to create SVR               
models for the 1000 trials. 
For the pseudo-quantum mechanism, we run trials for each ϵ value ranging from 0.250 to               
0.500 with increments of 0.005. The ϵ testing range for the pseudo-quantum mechanism is              
determined by 100 test trials that concludes that the optimal ϵ values are all greater than 0.300 and                  
less than 0.500. 
 
LS - SVR 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.85 94.89 94.86 94.86 94.88 94.87 94.86 94.79 94.86 94.86 94.88 94.85 94.83 94.90 94.82 
 
LS+ - SVR 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.87 94.87 94.87 94.87 94.87 94.89 94.84 94.87 94.86 94.88 94.87 94.87 94.87 94.87 94.89 
 
PQ - SVR 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.8644 94.8807 94.8815 94.8663 94.8542 
 
4.4   Classical Artificial Neural Networks 
Neural networks are an excellent tool for modeling and outperform many other traditional machine              
learning methods. They can also handle large amounts of data similar to Deep Learning, so after                
feature extraction, we can utilize the classical neural network to the fullest extent. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: We utilize a 2-layer shallow neural network with one hidden layer that contains 10 
neurons. Above is an example when softmax outputs 1. 
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 Neural networks consist of an input layer, hidden layers, and an output layer. We use a                
shallow two-layer feed-forward network with the activation as the sigmoid function: 
 
 
 
and softmax for the output neurons. To train the network through backpropagation, we use              
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) provided by the MATLAB Machine Learning toolbox. 
 
4.4.1   The Feed-Forward Pass 
Our network has parameters , where is the bias    w, ) (w , ; .. ; , )( b =  (1) b(1) . w(n )l b(n )l   bi
(l)     
associated with unit ​i later ​l + 1, and where denotes the parameter (weight) associated with          wij
(l)        
unit ​i​ in layer ​l​ and unit ​j​ in layer ​l​ + 1. Then, we can let 
 
 
 
Thus, 
 
 
Therefore, for input , the activation function iszi
(l + 1)  
 
 
4.4.2   Backpropagation 
To train a neural network, we use backpropagation. In our case, we use stochastic gradient descent                
to find the optimal parameters quickly. 
In LMS learning, the distance is given by We must minimize(T ) .2
1 ∑
 
p
p − Op 2  
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where  is the output from the neural network.(x)hw,b  
First, we perform a feed-forward pass, computing the activations at and up to          , a , ...a(2)  (3)      
the output layer  where  is the number of layers. For each output at note  in  set,Lnl nl i ,Lnl  
 
 
 
Then, for all hidden layers  for each node  in layer  set, , .., ,l = nl − 1 nl − 2 . 2 i ,l  
 
 
 
and compute 
 
 
To implement stochastic gradient descent, set for all The increment is 0, so there is no      Δ(l)(0) = 0    .l          
change. Then, for  and  computel = 1 ,n1 = 1  
 
 
 
To update the gradient, set 
 
 
 
Finally, we have 
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where  and  are learning rates, respectively.α1 α2  
LS - Classical NN 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.57 94.73 95.26 95.27 96.66 98.03 99.19 99.47 99.59 99.94 99.95 99.95 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
LS+ - Classical NN 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.59 94.77 95.59 95.15 97.18 98.26 98.35 99.10 99.50 99.68 99.80 99.87 99.90 99.90 99.91 
 
PQ - Classical NN 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.81 94.86 94.87 94.89 94.94 
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Figure 4.8: Comparing ε to the average percent accuracy of Classical Artificial Neural Network 
using the​ LS ​mechanism where 𝛾 = 1 
 
4.5   Deep Learning 
Deep Learning is by far one of the most important subsets of machine learning methods. Whereas                
classical artificial neural networks have two or three hidden layers, deep learning models, or deep               
neural networks, can contain hundreds of hidden layers. Deep learning models take large labeled              
training datasets and require high computer processing power. Applications for deep learning            
include self-driving cars, handwriting recognition, and object classification from images. 
We choose to use Deep Learning because of its many implications in modern research,              
including medical imaging and speech recognition in [10] and [25], and its connections with              
differential privacy [5]. Deep Learning enables automatic feature extraction during the process of             
learning, rather than the traditional pre-learning manual feature extraction. The result is a more              
accurate machine learning model and also a model that can handle vast amounts of data, contrary                
to methods such as logistic regression, SVM, and SVR. Deep Learning also performs well in               
classifying large amounts of complex data.  
The type of deep neural networks we employed is the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN),              
which effectively recognizes patterns of dataset in tensor forms. CNN’s are a class of Feedforward               
Artificial Neural Networks and are fully connected networks, meaning the neuron in each layer are               
connected to each neuron in the next layer. 
CNN’s extract and learn small patterns in input data primarily through the three operations:              
convolution, which is performed with a small kernel matrix, ReLu, a non-linear operation that              
replaces negative values with zero, and pooling, which sizes down the feature maps. In contrast to                
other types of networks, CNN’s input data has greater than or equal to three dimensions. For                
example, in color image processing,  input data has  height, width, and depth [22]. 
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Figure 4.9: Convolutional Neural Network dimensions 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Convolution operations 
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 Figure 4.11: A neural network with many hidden layers 
 
For the IPUMS Dataset, we use Google Colab to generate a deep neural network with 5                
layers. There are 4 hidden layers with 16, 18, 20, and 24 neuron units in each layer, respectively.                  
We train the network with back-propagation. The activation function for the hidden layers is RELU: 
 
 
 
and the activation function for the output layer is the sigmoid function: 
 
 
 
More details of the Deep Neural Network for the IPUMS Dataset are shown below. 
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Figure 4.12: Deep Neural Network model used for IPUMS Dataset 
 
For the MNIST Dataset, we use the CNN model from Keras [21] to create a convolutional                
neural network (CNN) with 8 layers. The CNN uses ReLU for the hidden layer activation function,                
and it uses softmax with 10 classes for the output layer activation function. More details of the CNN                  
are shown below. 
 
 
Figure 4.13: CNN model used for MNIST Dataset 
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ε = 0.5 
 
ε = 4 
 
ε = 16 
 
Original 
Figure 4.14: MNIST images with different ε values 
 
As shown in Figure 4.14, the MNIST image becomes less clear at lower ε values. As more                 
noise is added, the background of the image becomes less smooth. 
 
LS - Deep NN 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.92 94.65 94.38 94.38 94.38 94.24 94.65 94.51 95.20 94.65 94.51 94.79 95.61 95.06 95.47 
 
LS+ - Deep NN 
𝛾 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 94.92 95.13 95.72 95.66 97.08 98.51 98.33 99.27 99.67 99.78 99.93 99.98 99.99 99.99 100.00 
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 PQ - Convolutional NN 
ε 0.5 1 2 4 8 
% Accuracy 99.09 99.08 99.11 99.11 99.14 
 
In [5], Abadi ​et al. apply a differentially private stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm              
to MNIST, using a simple feed-forward neural network with ReLU units and a softmax output layer                
with 10 classes. Note that [5] guarantees (ε, δ)-differential privacy, which includes an added              
privacy threshold δ. (ε,δ)-differential privacy is used for mechanisms that do not utilize Laplace               
noise, and ε-differential privacy is the case where δ = 0. Thus, we compare our results to [5]’s                  
results from the smallest value of δ tested, which isδ = 10​-5​. Several comparisons for differentε                  
values are shown below: 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Percent accuracies for different ε values in the pseudo-quantum mechanism 
compared to Abadi ​et al.​’s differentially private SGD in [5] 
 
4.6   Differentially Private Imaging 
One interesting aspect of the pseudo-quantum mechanism is its ability to introduce complex values              
to a noisy dataset. In addition to testing our differentially private mechanisms in machine learning               
environments, we are able to use our pseudo-quantum mechanism to embed complex noise into              
images. 
Recall that the pseudo-quantum noise embedding intensity 𝛿 does not affectε, the privacy              
of the dataset. However, 𝛿 affects the statistical accuracy of the data. Higher values of 𝛿 allow more                  
embedding of noise into the dataset, while lower values of 𝛿 diminish the noise’s effect. 
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 From Remark 1, the least upper bound of 𝛿 is ​for all real mechanism outputs. For the          2√3 − 1         
machine learning environments, we set 𝛿 = 0.1 and vary ε. However, for embedding noise into                
images, we have more freedom and can introduce complex values to the image to obscure it further.                 
We do this by surpassing the least upper bound of for 𝛿. For example, a QR code becomes          2√3 − 1          
almost impossible to decipher once complex values are introduced: 
 
 
Original 
 
Absolute Value (Modulus) 
 
Real Part 
 
Imaginary Part 
Figure 4.16: Parts of a complex image after noise embedding by the pseudo-quantum mechanism 
with ε = 1 and 𝛿 = 0.7 
 
Notice that the absolute value (modulus) of the image is the best approximation to the original, yet                 
it is not close to being accurate. All three parts of the noisy QR code in Figure 4.16 have become                    
unscannable. We can also test for different values of 𝛿, as shown below. 
 
 
𝛿 = 0.1 
 
𝛿 = 0.4 
 
𝛿 = 0.7 
 
𝛿 = 1.0 
Figure 4.17: Display of the absolute value (modulus) of the image after noise embedding by the 
pseudo-quantum mechanism with ε = 1 
42 
 
 As 𝛿 increases, the complex part of the image values increases, and the image becomes more noisy.                 
For 𝛿 = 0.7 and 1.0, the QR codes in Figure 4.17 are unscannable. 
Although values of 𝛿 greater than ​allow for more noise addition, they are only      2√3 − 1          
applicable to non-machine learning environments, such as imaging, due to the complex parts that              
are introduced. Because 𝛿 is independent from ε, the same level of privacy can still be preserved                 
for all values of 𝛿. Note that all four images in Figure 4.16 have the same privacy,ε = 1. Low values                      
of 𝛿 should be utilized for greater statistical similarity to the original dataset, while high values of 𝛿                  
should be used for large deviation from the original dataset. Future research and testing can be                
done for larger values of 𝛿. 
 
4.7   Results 
1. The accuracies for the five machine learning environments are all above 94%, demonstrating that               
all three mechanisms allow the addition of noise while maintaining the same statistical trends in               
the original data. 
 
The ​LS and ​LS​+ mechanisms yield similar accuracies for all machine learning environments except              
Deep Learning. The relative inaccuracy of the ​LS mechanism in Deep Learning may be due to its                 
smaller-sized training and testing sets compared to those of the ​LS​+ mechanism. Both the ​LS and                
LS​+ mechanisms improve in accuracy with increasing ε values, while the pseudo-quantum            
mechanism has mostly consistent accuracies. 
 
For ​LS ​and ​LS​+, the accuracies are largely influenced by the ε parameter. For the vast majority of                  
the trials, ε = 8 results in the highest accuracies. In Logistic Regression and Classical ANN, both ​LS                  
and ​LS​+ reach 100% testing classification accuracy when ε = 8. In addition, as 𝛾 increases, less                 
noise is added (by Theorem 1). Thus the accuracy increases, as shown as a trend in the ​LS ​and ​LS​+                    
data. Although larger values of ε provide greater accuracy, they give less privacy to users.               
Companies should consider the trade-off between higher differential privacy (smaller ε) and            
higher statistical integrity (larger ε) when choosing the parameter values. 
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Figure 4.18: Average percent accuracies of mechanisms separated by machine learning 
environments. 𝛾 = 1 for ​LS​ and ​LS​+, and 𝛿 = 0.1 and η = 0 for the pseudo-quantum mechanism. 
 
2. The pseudo-quantum mechanism consistently scores high accuracies across all fiveε values for              
all five machine learning environments, with the lowest average accuracy being 94.80% forε = 0.5                
in logistic regression, and the highest being 99.14% forε = 8 in the Convolutional Neural Network                 
environment. Furthermore, in comparison to Abadi ​et. al.​’s differentially private SGD algorithm in             
[5], the pseudo-quantum mechanism performs exceptionally well (see Figure 4.14). Note that the             
accuracy achieved in [21] using the same Convolutional Neural Network as ours without any noise               
addition (no privacy) is 99.25%. 
 
Although the pseudo-quantum mechanism does not give high accuracies relative to the ​LS and ​LS​+               
mechanisms in Logistic Regression, SVM, SVR, and Classical ANN, it is superior in its usage of higher                 
computational power and provides greater data security in comparison to the ​LS and ​LS​+              
mechanisms. Instead of adding noise like the ​LS and ​LS​+ mechanisms, the pseudo-quantum             
mechanism embeds noise into the dataset in the wavelet domain. As mentioned in Section 3.4.3, the                
probability of decoding the noise added in the pseudo-quantum mechanism is 2​-​mn​/3 for η = 0,                
which is highly improbable. 
 
Varying 𝛿 in the pseudo-quantum mechanism does not affect the privacy of the dataset, but it                
controls the numerical deviation of the noisy dataset from the original dataset, as shown in Section                
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 4.6. High values of 𝛿 should only be used in non-machine learning environments, such as imaging,                
because they allow for complex values in the noisy dataset. Data privacy managers should pay close                
attention to the increasing obscurity of the noisy dataset as they increase the 𝛿 values. 
 
3. When choosing between the three mechanisms, data scientists should consider using ​LS or ​LS​+               
for binary classification models (such as Linear Regression and Support Vector Machine) and             
shallow neural networks, while they should use the pseudo-quantum for accuracy in larger datasets              
and more complex machine learning environments (such as Convolutional Neural Networks). 
 
5   Conclusions and Future Research 
Instead of spending time and resources attempting to develop encryption methods that do             
not necessarily guarantee ε-differential privacy or protection from adversary attacks, companies           
can use privacy-preserving mechanisms to protect personal data. Our three proposed mechanisms            
encrypt noise into data after DMWT, which presents many advantages over other methods. First,              
input perturbation allows easy integration of our mechanisms into existing data environments. In             
addition, removing the noise becomes practically impossible as long as the adversary does not              
know the exact noise function, which is unique to each scenario, as the function depends on the set                  
of inputs being changed. If put into use, companies will find our input perturbation mechanisms               
slightly more complicated but more effective. 
Our mechanisms add sufficient noise to achieveε-differential privacy while still preserving            
overall statistical trends within the dataset. Setting 𝛾 = 1, 𝛿 = 0.1, and η = 0, we achieve the                    
following average accuracies for our three mechanisms for ε = 1 tested in the five machine                
learning environments: 
 
 Logistic Regression SVM SVR Classical ANN Deep Learning 
LS 95.08% 94.90% 94.88% 96.66% 94.38% 
LS​+ 95.05% 94.88% 94.87% 97.18% 97.08% 
Pseudo-Quantum 94.92% 94.84% 94.88% 94.86% 99.08% 
 
For all five machine learning methods, the models correctly predict the label variables with              
average accuracies greater than 94%. The results show that companies can employ wavelet             
transformations and still be able to analyze the dataset for correlations and trends. In addition, all                
three mechanisms use input perturbation, which is the addition of noise directly into the dataset.               
This allows for easy integration with existing data environments, such as MySQL and Vertica,              
because the mechanisms do not need to be modified for each data management system. 
The ​LS​+ mechanism is applicable to dynamic datasets, which are datasets that are             
constantly increasing in size. As a result, companies could store two separate datasets—private and              
public—where the public dataset is updated with every new batch of samples added to the private                
dataset and still preserves differential privacy through use of ​LS​+. Furthermore, the partitioning             
aspect of the ​LS​+ mechanism allows for parallel computing, cutting down on computational time              
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 even more. In the future, more complex deep learning methods should be used for ​LS and ​LS​+ in the                   
future to increase our mechanisms’ accuracy. 
The pseudo-quantum mechanism stands as the most advanced method out of our three             
mechanisms because of its higher computational power. Additionally, it provides the most            
consistent accuracies for all ε values. We see the future of data privacy as a collaborative effort                 
between engineers and data scientists working to preserve differential privacy for the safety of the               
greater community. The pseudo-quantum mechanism is one of the first steps towards that goal. 
In the future, more research and testing can go into improving the pseudo-quantum             
mechanism to withstand greater noise and enabling its use for dynamic datasets and parallel              
computing like the ​LS​+ mechanism. As our mechanisms require long processing times for large              
datasets, another priority would be to decrease the computation time by finding new ways to create                
and store large wavelets and perform the processes. Additionally, a major goal can be to               
incorporate randomized response, which is outlined in [14], in the three mechanisms so that the               
original dataset does not have to be stored to provide high statistical integrity. 
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